India’s curious inflexibility in trying to fix its bad loan crisis is leading to unforeseen problems

India’s crackdown on companies that have defaulted on loan repayments is reshaping the country’s economy in fundamental ways. As the first three articles in this series detailed, competitive advantage is being tilted towards larger firms because only a handful of buyers is picking up most of the insolvent firms on sale. Between the resulting consolidation and the fact that most of these firms are changing hands at low rates, existing companies will struggle to compete. In addition, regional companies are being pushed into businesses beyond their core strengths.

These processes have been in motion since January 2016, when India’s banks, prompted by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government and the Reserve Bank of India, started taking defaulting firms to the National Company Law Tribunal in an attempt to recover outstanding loans.

These structural transformations have been caused by the curious inflexibility that characterises India’s insolvency proceedings, which place the blame for bankruptcy entirely on the firm’s promoters, experts said. “The government is not making any concessions,” complained the chief financial officer of a steel plant in Chhattisgarh which has slipped into insolvency proceedings. “It is just putting the project up for sale.”

Inflexibility also shows in how these distressed projects are being rehabilitated. This is obvious from the way the proceedings have unfolded for a thermal power plant set up some 10 years ago by a well-regarded business group in North India. The group’s chief financial officer, who is in his mid-50s, said in his 35-year career, he has never seen anything similar to India’s bankruptcy proceedings that his unit is now facing.

We have the fourth — and concluding — part of our series on India’s insolvency proceedings out today. The first part, to recap, had flagged some curious patterns showing up as companies change hands to argue we need to pay more attention to these proceedings.  The second looked at the handful of buyers picking up most of these stranded assets. The third looked at what this means for local capital as global capital (and big capital) comes in.  Today’s piece builds on those observations, using them to point out the self-damaging inflexibility that characterises India’s insolvency proceedings, tries to understand its origins, asks if there was a better way to handle all this, and then ends.