Biggest winner of Modi’s loan-in-59-minutes plan for small companies is an Ahmedabad fintech startup

On November 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a slew of announcements aimed at reviving India’s faltering micro, small and medium enterprises. One of these was about a dedicated digital platform – www.psbloansin59minutes.com – to enable them to access loans of upto Rs 1 crore in just 59 minutes.

Unlike their larger counterparts, India’s smaller companies have long faced difficulty in accessing bank loans. The psbloansin59minutes website was presented as the solution. Once a firm uploads key information such as tax returns and ownership details, proprietary algorithms on the website appraise the application, determine the loan amount that can be given and then connect the applicant to a bank branch – all in under 59 minutes.

As it turns out, the website mirrors the aims outlined in a tender issued by the state-owned Small Industries Development Bank of India on January 22, seeking to hire a consultant to set up a new legal entity that would facilitate contactless lending.

“The solution will use algorithms and techniques to read complex balance sheets, IT returns and bank statements in a very short time,” said the tender. “These solutions can easily capture the basic details of the applicant from present documents. Smart analytics will enable the proposed solution to find discrepancies and automatically pull information from credit bureaus. More importantly the decision-making process for a loan officer can become simpler as the solution provides a summary of credit, valuation and verification on a user-friendly dashboard.”

The tender went on to define eligibility requirements. To qualify, consultants needed to have earned a fee of at least Rs 50 crore from management consulting during the three preceding years. “The consultant should have been in existence in India since April 01, 2012,” it stipulated.

Once a consultant was shortlisted, said the tender, a new legal entity would be formed, in the form of a company with SIDBI and other banks as shareholders.

However, a closer look at psbloansin59minutes shows that the company behind it does not quite meet the tender stipualtions. The website is not run by a new legal entity as envisioned by the SIDBI tender. Instead, it is run by a Ahmedabad-headquartered fintech company called CapitaWorld Platform, which was set up in 2015.

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Arun Jaitley is being disingenuous in blaming RBI for the troubles of India’s small and medium firms

What India’s Finance Minister says…

The finance minister this week criticised the central bank for failing to check indiscriminate bank lending from 2008 to 2014 which has now ripened into a bad loan crisis. The attack was accompanied by the government invoking never-used powers under the Reserve Bank Act to issue directions to the bank’s governor, Urjit Patel.

What he stays mum on…

If the MSME sector was tottering by the time Arun Jaitley became India’s finance minister, the next four and a half years felled it.

First came demonetisation. On November 8, 2016, the government suddenly announced that Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes were no longer legal tender. This created an unprecedented cash shortage in the country. As economic activity dropped, households and small businesses took a beating.

Less than a year later, on July 1, 2017, came another shock. The Goods and Services Tax was introduced even before the MSMEs’ turnovers had returned to pre-demonetisation levels. As Scroll.in reported from Gujarat at the time, India’s new tax regime for businesses favours formal economy players more than those in the informal economy – which is entirely made up of MSMEs. In South India, high tax slabs pushed MSMEs in the automotive cluster of Hosur into the red, forcing them to take bank loans to pay taxes.

While firms were still grappling with the new tax regime and figuring how to survive, there came the cash crunch of December 2017. As Scroll.in reported, multiple reasons were at work, including a collapse of the government’s cash distribution protocols.

From a quick comment published today on the government’s attempt to pin blame on MSME distress on the RBI.

On the six factors which cumulatively added up to India’s unprecedented cash squeeze

India’s current cash crunch is a real enigma.

To begin with, there is its sheer unprecedented nature. In all the years since Independence, India has never seen something like it. “We have heard of coin shortages but never a cash shortage,” said MS Sriram, visiting faculty at the Indian Institute of Management-Bangalore’s Centre for Public Policy. “I certainly have not in my life. This is new.”

How the shortage played out is odd too. It is acute in some states but not in others. For instance, in Tura, the largest town in Meghalaya’s Garo Hills, an official at the main State Bank of India office, which disburses cash to the bank’s other branches in the region, told Scroll.in that cash reserves had dwindled to almost a fifth of the required amount. “There is pressure from other branches to release money, but we have not been able to give even half of what they have been demanding,” the official said.

A clutch of other states – including Bihar, Assam, Maharashtra, Telangana and Karnataka – are facing shortages too. But states like Delhi are less affected.

The discrepancy is visible within states too. In Maharashtra, Mumbai is fine but Nashik is not. In Tamil Nadu, big banks in Hosur say they are getting all the money they need but their counterparts in surrounding villages say the situation is bad. “We contact our sister branches to see if any of them has surplus cash,” said the manager of a public-sector bank in Belathur, a village about 20 km west of Hosur.

There are other puzzles. The cash squeeze showed up not gradually but suddenly. Reports began coming in from several states from February. If the cash squeeze was only due to a growing mismatch between cash supply and the demands of the growing economy, it should have shown up gradually, experts say.

As a report in Scroll.in noted earlier this month, several theories emerged to explain the shortage, covering the gamut from obvious to plausible to off-the-wall. Shortly afterwards, several Scroll.in reporters fanned out across the country, speaking to people in both cities and villages, to try to identify the genesis of this shortage.

Here is what we found.

Out today, with my colleagues Abhishek Dey, Mridula Chari, Vinita Govindrajan and Arunabh Saikia, a more deeply reported piece (than the previous one) which seeks to trace this cash squeeze back to its (idiotic) origins. Do read.

Aadhaar shows India’s governance is susceptible to poorly tested ideas pushed by powerful people

This series has flagged a puzzling trend. State governments are struggling to use Aadhaar-based fingerprint authentication in ration shops. At the same time, a rising number of companies are integrating Aadhaar into their databases.

This is puzzling because from its inception, Aadhaar, India’s Unique Identification project, was pitched as integral to the modernisation of social welfare delivery in India.

Why is it failing at the job it was created for while proving useful elsewhere?

The answers vary depending on whom you ask. Former officials of the Unique Identification Authority of India, the government agency which issues Aadhaar numbers and manages the database, blame state governments and banks for poor execution of Aadhaar-based welfare delivery. State governments in turn blame banks and poor internet connectivity and the failures of biometrics-based technology.

These are – at best – incomplete explanations.

The roots of Aadhaar’s mission drift lie deeper.

why people in Nagaland and Manipur are responding cautiously to the new Naga peace accord

A day after the NDA announced its “historic” peace accord with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), speculation is rife in the two states affected most by the agreement – Nagaland and Manipur. What is the shape of the agreement hammered out by government and the rebel group?

After all, the NSCN was formed in the aftermath of the Shillong Accord of 1975, signed between the government of India and the Naga National Council, which soon faded into irrelevance. The terms of this agreement had stipulated that underground Naga organisations would give up arms and “formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement”. This accord was rejected as a sell-out to the Indian government.

Will the terms of the new agreement go any further?

See the story here.